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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
ROBERT D. MORAN *
It is a Persian custom to encourage prospective rug buyers to
"live with" their purchase for a time to see if the rug suits their
needs and tastes. Only by living with it from day to day can the
buyer find out if it does for him what he wants it to do. New
legislation is similar. Very often the true meaning of a new law and
its effect upon those covered by its provisions do not become appal .:
ent until the legislation has been around for a period of time. This is
particularly true when the new legislative scheme departs from
traditional practice. The Occupational Safety and Health Act' is a
case in point. It has been around for more than three years now.
Many of those who opposed its enactment most strenuously are
finding that living with it is not as bad as anticipated. Others are
not so sure.
This comment will focus on a problem which arose from one
relatively minor provision of the Act nearly two years after the law's
enactment. Simply stated, the question is whether the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSAHRC or the Commis-
sion), the body created to adjudicate contested enforcement actions
under the Act, 2
 should be a party to proceedings in the court of
appeals when a review is sought of its decision in a case.
One subsection of the Act specifically authorizes an appeal to
the United States court of appeals by any person "aggrieved by an
order of the Commission" 3 and another grants similar authority to
the Secretary of Labor. 4
 The Commission itself, however, is neither
specifically authorized to participate nor prohibited from participat-
ing in review proceedings. As a general rule, many administrative
agencies routinely appear in appellate proceedings to defend their
orders whether or not there is specific statutory authorization
therefor. 5
 The Commission, however, is quite unlike most adminis-
trative agencies because its functions are solely adjudicatory, and it,
in fact, has nothing to administer. This raises the question whether,
* Member of the Massachusetts bar and Chairman, U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission,
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
3
 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 660(b) (1970).
5 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606-07 (1966); See also 3 K. Davis, Adminis-
trative Law Treatise § 22,15, at 283 n.23 (1958).
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except for its name and its placement in the executive branch, the
Commission is a de facto court, and as such should abstain from
participation in appellate review of its orders.
In 1973; the second full year of the Act's existence, one or more
petitions for review of OSAHRC decisions were filed in each of the
eleven circuits, a total of 48 cases for the year. 6
 In each of these
cases OSAHRC was named as a respondent and the specific issue of
the Commission's party status has already been argued in four of the
cases.' Two of these cases were decided in 1973, 8 and in both the
court neatly sidestepped this issue. A third case was dismissed
without opinion when the court concluded that the ruling being
appealed was not a final decision. 9
The other case in which the question of the Commission's party
status was specifically raised was Dale M. Madden Construction,
Inc. v. Hodgson,'° which was the very first Commission decision
ever to reach a United States court of appeals. The case was
initiated on July 12, 1971, less than three months after the effective
date of the Act, when the Labor Department's Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) issued a citation and a $650
penalty proposal to Dale M. Madden Construction, Inc. (Madden).
Madden contested the action within the statutorily prescribed time"
and the OSAHRC Administrative Law Judge hearing the case ruled
Of the types of litigation which can arise under the Act, petitions for review of
OSAHRC decisions, under 29 U.S.C. ** 660(a) & (b) (1970), arise most frequently. But cases
have also been litigated, under 29 U.S.C. 655(6 (1970), challenging the validity of an
occupational safety and health standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. E.g.,
Associated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.
1973); Industrial Union Dept, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, CCH Empi. Safety & Health Guide
17,618, at 22,029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). There have also been cases, under 29 U.S.C. * 662(a)
(1970), to restrain conditions of employment constituting an imminent danger to employee
safety and health. E.g., Hodgson v. A.G. Pinkston Co., [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety &
Health Decs. 11 15,498, at 20,781 (E.D. Va. 1972); Hodgson v. C.N. Flagg & Co., Civil No.
15-268 (D. Conn., Sept. 14, 1972); Hodgson v. Greenfield & Assoc., Civil No. 37-596 (D.
Mich., Feb. 5, 1972); BNA 1 OSHC 1015 (D. Mich. 1972). In addition, cases have been
brought, under 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), to prevent unlawful discrimination against an
employee who asserted his rights under the Act to complain about hazardous working
conditions. E.g., Hodgson v. J.F. White Contractor Co., Civil No. 72-3052-G (D. Mass.,
filed Oct. 3, 1972). Certain criminal proceedings are also authorized under 29 U.S.C. 666(e)
(1970). E.g., United States v. Turcon Co., Criminal No. 72-0.239 (D. Neb., Feb. 21, 1974).
Brennan v. OSAHRC & J.W. Bounds, 488 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973); Brennan v.
OSAHRC & Brent Towing Co., 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973); Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc.
v. Hodgson, Civil No. 72-1874 (9th Cir., decided July 29, 1974); Secretary of Labor v.
OSAHRC & Thorleif Larson & Son, Inc., Civil No. 73-1232 (7th Cir., Jan. 22, 1974).
J.W. Bounds, 488 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973); Brent Towing, 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1973).
Thorleif Larson, Civil No. 73-1232 (7th Cir., Jan. 22, 1974).
LO Civil No. 72-1874 (9th Cir., filed May 17, 1972).
11
 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
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that there was no violation. 12 His decision was subsequently over-
turned by the three-member Commission which sustained the
OSHA citation and assessed the $650 penalty." In May 1972,
Madden filed the first petition for review of an OSAHRC decision,"
naming as respondents the Secretary of Labor, the Commission and
its Executive Secretary." The Attorney General appeared as coun-
sel for the Secretary of Labor. No appearance was filed for
OSAHRC or its Executive Secretary.
Late in 1972, the Secretary of Labor and counsel representing
Madden reached a settlement of the case which called for dismissal
of Madden's petition and OSHA's acceptance of a $150 penalty in
lieu of the Commission's $650 assessment. Before filing the agree-
ment with the court, the Department of Justice sought the consent
of the Commission to the settlement. Each of the three Commission
members declined to sign the document. The Commission Chairman
felt that OSAHRC was not a party in interest before the court of
appeals. Analogizing to the non-participation of United States Dis-
trict Court and Tax Court judges, the Chairman concluded that it
would be improper to join in a settlement reached on a Commission
decision which was pending on appeal. The refusal of the other two
members was premised on the belief that the Secretary of Labor and
an employer were without authority to agree upon disposition of a
Commission case for a lesser penalty than that which the Commis-
sion had assessed.
This effectively stalemated the case. Justice Department attor-
neys, in an attempt to resolve the issue, filed a motion with the court
seeking approval of the settlement in which it was recited:
While the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission has refused to join in this settlement, its con-
sent is not necessary. Section 6(e) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(e) authorizes the
Secretary to compromise, mitigate or settle any penalty
assessed under the Act. Furthermore . . . the review com-
mission is not properly an active party to this proceeding.
Instead it is essentially an administrative court which, like
the Tax Court, does not properly have an adversary in-
terest in its decisions once they are rendered)'
" Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc., [1971-1973) CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs.
11 15,027, at 20,026 (Admin. Law Judge 1971) (OSHRC Doc. No. 9).
15 Secretary of Labor v. Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc., 11971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety &
Health Decs. 11 15,048, at 20,097 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 9).
14 The appeal was filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
15 See [1971-1973J CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 11 15,049, at 20,099.
16 Motion for Approval of Settlement, filed:July 11, 1973, Dale M. Madden Constr. Inc.
v. Hodgson, Civil No. 72-1874 (9th Cir., filed May 17, 1972).
1091
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The Commission's posture in the Madden case caused some
discomfort within the Department of Justice because it presented the
Attorney General with the dilemma of two conflicting statutory
duties. As counsel for the Secretary of Labor, he must assume the
traditional lawyer's role of arguing his client's position before the
court in appeals from decisions of OSAHRC.' 7 But as General
Counsel for the United States Government, he alone is authorized to
give legal advice to the Commission." It would seem, however, that
the Attorney General has the legal power to resolve the issue of the
Commission's party status under his authority to rule upon ques-
tions of law arising in the administration of any agency of the
executive branch." This power has not been exercised, but the
Attorney General has tried to present the issue to the court of
appeals during its consideration of the Maddenn case and three
others. 21
 In all four cases, the Commission received specific authori-
zation from the Attorney General to employ counsel to represent its
interests in the proceedings. 22 Accordingly, the Commission filed a
brief in each case. Invariably, the Justice Department moved to
strike the brief on the grounds that the Commission was not a
proper party in interest before the court of appeals.
The 5th Circuit has twice refused to rule on the issue of
whether the OSAHRC should be a party to proceedings when a
review is sought of its decision in a case. In Secretary of Labor v.
OSAHRC & Brent Towing Co., 23
 the court said:
[W]e decline to render what in essence would be an advi-
sory opinion simply for the purpose of untangling the pro-
cedural dogfight in which the Secretary and the Commis-
sion have become ensnarled. . . . [The] court should not
undertake to resolve a contest between two federal agen-
cies as to their respective rights, powers, duties and re-
sponsibilities in circumstances where the chief party in
interest has long since, for reasons best known to itself,
declined to remain the focal center for an administrative
whirlwind of such minor proportions. 24
17
 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 660(b), 663 (1970).
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1970).
19 28 U.S.C. § 512 (1970).
211
 Civil No. 72-1874 (9th Cir., filed May 17, 1972).
21 J.W. Bounds, 488 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973); Brent Towing, 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1973); Thorleif Larson, Civil No. 73-1232 (7th Cir., Jan. 22, 1974).
22
 Query whether 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) prohibits even this procedure. That section
limits representation to "officers of the Department of Justice." If this can be overlooked, a
conflict of interest situation is apparent since counsel must be "under the direction of the
Attorney General." See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970).
23
 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973).
24
 Id. at 619-20.
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Five months later, citing the Brent Towing case, the same circuit
ruled:
We decline the - invitation of the Commission to resolve
at this time the conflict between the Secretary of Labor and
the Commission as to their respective rights, powers,
duties, and responsibilities . . . since such a determination
is not necessary to our decision herein. 25
Despite the court's reluctance to rule on the party status question,
the issue exists, and is likely to reappear constantly until finally
resolved.
Any approach to the resolution of this question ought to include
an effort to divine the congressional intent. Since administrative
agencies are creatures of the legislature, the congressional intent
regarding the powers and duties of those bodies is determinative
unless the congressional scheme runs afoul of the Constitution. 26
Neither the Occupational Safety and Health Act nor the comments
and reports of Congress in passing the Act directly address the
question of whether the Commission is to be made a party in
reviews of its decisions.
This alone is not determinative of the issue, for it is well settled
that a statute creating an agency in the executive branch of govern-
ment need not contain a specific authorization of a power in order
for courts to uphold the exercise of that power. 27
 Administrative
actions not specifically authorized by statute have been upheld when
they were deemed necessary to further a conferred power or when
the exercise of the power was consistent with the legislative purpose
in creating the agency. 28
 The statutory functions assigned to the
Commission therefore must be examined to determine if ,there is
implied authority for the Commission to appear in review proceed-
ings. The legislative history must also be surveyed to determine if
party status for the Commission is consistent with any articulated
congressional purpose.
THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME FOR JOB SAFETY
Basically the Act assigns adjudicatory functions to the Commis-
sion, and rule promulgation, prosecution, and enforcement to the
Secretary of Labor. The Act requires employers to comply with the
25 .I.W. Bounds, 488 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Or. 1973).
26
 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); Regents v. Carroll 338 U.S.
586, 597-98 (1950); Stark v. Wickard 321 U.S, 288, 309 (1944).
27
 Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36, 44 (10th Cir. 1963).
26
 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966); Pan Am. World Airways Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F,2d 36 (10th Cir. 1963).
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occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Sec-
retary of Labor. 29 The Secretary is authorized to conduct inspec-
tions of places of employment 30 and to cite employers for violations
of the law whenever it appears that the employer is not complying
with the standards. 3 ' The citations become due and payable if the
person cited does not take positive action to assert his right to a
hearing within fifteen working days. 32 If the employer fails to con-
test, the Secretary's citation and proposed penalty are deemed the
final order of the Commission. 33 But by notifying the Secretary of
Labor of an intention to contest a citation, an employer activates the
hearing mechanism of the Commission.
[T]he Secretary shall immediately advise the Commission
of such notification, and the Commission shall afford an
opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with section 554
of Title 5 . . .). The Commission shall thereafter issue an
order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying or
vacating the Secretary's citation or proposed penalty, or
directing other appropriate relief . . . . 34
Overall, there are very few references to the Commission in the
Act. It is created as an independent agency of the .executive
branch" but, except for the portion of the Act set forth above, the
only reference to the congressional purpose with respect to
OSAHRC is contained in the following words:
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy
. . . to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources— . . . (3) . . .
by creating an Occupationkl Safety and Health Review
Commission for carrying out adjudicatory functions . . . 36
The Commission, as structured, actually provides two levels of
adjudication: initial hearing and decision by an Administrative Law
Judge with discretionary review thereof by a tribunal consisting of
three Presidentially-appointed members. 37 Each member is ap-
29 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1970).
30 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970).
31
 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970).
32 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970).
33 Id.
34 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
34
 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
37 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970). During the Commission's first 3 years of existence approxi-
mately 10% of the decisions were rendered by the 3-member tribunal. The balance became
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pointed for a term of six years from among persons who "by reason
of training, education, or experience are qualified to carry out the
functions of the Commission . . . ."38 The Administrative Law
Judges are appointed by the Commission Chairman, 39 and have life
tenure, pursuant to Civil Service Commission regulations.
Judicial review of the Commission's actions is similar in scope
to that accorded jury verdicts of lower courts and decisions of
regulatory agencies which exercise adjudicatory powers. The Act
provides that "[Ole finding of the Commission with respect to ques-
tions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole, shall be conclusive."'" Except in extraordi-
nary circumstances, the appellate court will only consider objections
which were raised during the proceedings before the Commission.'"
In addition to his authority to promulgate occupational safety
and health standards, to inspect for compliance therewith and to
cite for violations, the Secretary of Labor is vested with all other
administrative duties under the Act. 42 He is, for example, empow-
ered to grant variances from the standards, for certain specified
reasons,43 to promulgate record keeping and reporting regulations to
be observed by employers with respect to occupational accidents
and diseases," to approve and finance state safety and health
plans, 45 and to institute safety training programs for employers and
employees. 46 Perhaps most significantly for the purpose of the party
status question, it is the Secretary, and not the Commission, who is
authorized to apply for enforcement of the Commission's orders. 47
Only one statement in the Act arguably can be interpreted as
intimating that specific authority for party status was contemplated
by Congress. The section of the Act providing for judicial review
declares that when an aggrieved party files a petition for appellate
review of a Commission decision, "a copy of such petition shall be
forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commission
and to the other parties, and thereupon the Commission shall file in
Commission decisions 30 days after being decided by a Judge because no member exercised
his right of discretionary review during that period. Id.
33 29 U.S.C. * 661(a) (1970). While on first blush some believe this language implies
experience in occupational safety and health, it is evident that since their responsibilities are
only adjudicatory their qualifications have to be in the latter field.
39
 29 U.S.C. § 661(d) (1970).
40 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
41 Id.
42
 Certain responsibility for research and related activities, however, has been delegated
to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. See 29 U.S.C. § 669 (1970).
43
 29 U.S.C, § 655(d) (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. 657(c) (1970).
43 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1970).
46
 29 U.S.C. § 670(c) (1970).
29 U.S.C. 660(b) (1970).
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the court the record in the proceeding . . . "48
 This phrase could be
construed as an indication of a congressional intent that the Com-
mission would be a party to the review of its decisions in the court
of appeals, in addition to the parties who participated in the
OSAHRC proceeding. Such a construction is hardly tenable. The
use of the phrase "other parties" distinguishes the party filing the
review petition from the other participants and thus relieves the
clerk from having to forward a copy of the petition to the petitioner.
The transmittal of the petition to the Commission merely notifies
that body of its duty to file the record of the proceeding with the
court for review. Hence, a more reasonable interpretation of the
distinction made between the "Commission and other parties" is
that the Commission is not a party. Any other construction would
be redundant.
Indeed, two other provisions in the Act strongly suggest that
upon rendering a decision, the Commission's work is at an end. The
Secretary of Labor is directed to publish in the Federal Register the
reasons for his action whenever he "compromises, mitigates, or
settles any penalty assessed under this [Act]." 49 The Commission,
however, is given no role in the settlement of cases. The Secretary's
authority to negotiate settlements is consistent with his overall re-
sponsibility for obtaining compliance with the law as well as with
his prosecution and enforcement duties under the Act. As noted
earlier, administrative agencies which have prosecution and en-
forcement functions are active participants in appellate litigations°
and, as a necessary concomitant of the same, they possess the
authority to participate in settlement negotiations. The Labor De-
partment is such an administrative agency. The Commission, on the
other hand, is like a court: it does not prosecute; it does not enforce;
and it has no business being involved in settlement negotiations once
a case has been decided.
There is another feature of the Act which supports the proposi-
tion that the Commission was never intended to participate in
appellate court proceedings. The Act expressly provides for the
representation of the Secretary of Labor in litigation: "[T]tle Solicitor
of Labor may appear for and represent the Secretary in any civil
litigation brought under this chapter but all such litigations shall be
subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General."s I The
45
 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
49
 29 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1970). The only penalties that are assessed under the Act are those
resulting from final orders of the Commission; the Secretary of Labor may only "propose"
penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(a), 659(c), 666(i) (1970).
5° See text at note 5 supra.
S1 29 U.S.C. § 663 (1970).
1096
PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS
Act, however, does not contain a provision for the representation of
the Commission. Under the legislation as originally proposed, the
adjudicatory functions were assigned to a Board of Appeals within
the Labor Department. That version of the bill specifically provided
"ltJhat in any appeal of any action of the Board brought by the
Secretary under section 8(a), the Solicitor shall represent the Secre-
tary; the Attorney General shall represent the Board in such
proceedings."52 Just prior to enactment of the law, the case-deciding
function was taken out of the Department of Labor and a new
independent Commission was established to assume those duties."
Concurrently, the provision for representation of the adjudicatory
body was deleted. 54 This action by the Congress strongly suggests
that the failure to provide for representation of the body exercising
adjudicatory functions was intentional and thus that Congress did
not intend for the Commission to appear in the court of appeals to
defend its orders.
An overview of the legislative history of the Act reveals that the
Commission was created to ensure public confidence in the fairness
of the Act's administration by vesting adjudicatory functions in an
autonomous agency which would be totally independent of the
Secretary of Labor. The Commissicin originated with an amendment
on the Senate floor to the bill that had been reported out of Commit-
tee. The amendment was designed to quell the fears of businessmen
that they would not be dealt with impartially under the Act by the
Labor Department, which was perceived as an advocate of the
"Labor", as opposed to the "Business", point of view. Senators
Javits and Holland advanced the idea that the creation of an inde-
pendent tribunal would assist in overcoming these fears and thereby
help to promote a cooperative attitude in obtaining compliance with
the new law's numerous requireMents. Voluntary compliance by
employers was considered crucial to the goal of reducing hazards in
the workplace. 55
The contemplated division of functions between the Secretary
and the Commission was described by Senator Prouty, one of the
conferees, in advocating passage of the bill:
The original bills introduced in both bodies provided
that the Secretary of Labor would promulgate all health
52 S. 2788, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. §.8(e) (1969); H.R. 13373, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)
(1969). See 115 Cong. Rec, 22512, 22515 (1969) (text of S. 2788).
53 See 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1970).
54 See 29 U.S.C, § 663 (1970).
55 116 Cong. Rec. 35607, 37607-08, 37609-12 (1970) (remarks of Senators Saxbe, Davits,
Holland and Dominick). See also Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor &
Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 298, 462-65, 469-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
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and safety standards and would also be responsible for
deciding appeals from employers who contested violations
found or penalties assessed by inspectors employed by the
Department of Labor.
The conference report . . . adopts provisions con-
tained in both the House- and Senate-passed bills, estab-
lishing an independent Commission to review all contested
cases involving violations found or penalties assessed by
the Secretary of Labor. The Commission's order in turn is
subject to judicial review in an appropriate U.S. court of
appeals. 56
The purpose of this separation was explained by Senator Williams,
who observed that the provision for an independent Commission
"was designed to separate the adjudication of violations from the
other functions performed by the Secretary of Labor, in order to
provide every assurance that fairness and due process would be fully
served."57
Various other remarks emphasize the judicial character of the
Commission. Senator javits, co-sponsor of the amendment, de-
scribed the Commission as an "autonomous body which has tenure
and quasi-judicial power," 58 and as a "quasi-judicial authority ex-
pressly delegated for that purpose." 59 Speaking in support of the
Davits amendment, Senator Holland expressed his wish that the
Commission operate like a court when ruling on contested citations:
I think we need to have as nearly the judicial temperament
and the assurance of judicial settlement of these particular
arguments as we can guarantee in this legislation . . . I
favor the setting up of an independent quasi-judicial body,
which . . ought to be just as dependable as the courts
themselves, and so regarded by all concerned—just as
objective, just as practical, just as impartial in their
approach."
It is also apparent from the legislative history that the Commis-
sion was created exclusively for the purpose of performing ad-
judicatory functions. A report submitted by Senator Saxbe compar-
ing the Committee bill, under which all functions were vested in the
56 116 Cong, Rec. 41763 (1970) (remarks of Senator Prouty); Legislative History at 1149.
5 ' 116 Cong. Rec. 41763 (1970) (remarks of Senator Williams); Legislative History at
1147.
58
 116 Cong. Rec. 37608 (1970) (remarks of Senator javits); Legislative History at 465.
59 116 Cong. Rec. 37607 (1970) (remarks of Senator javits); Legislative History at 463.
60 116 Cong. Rec. 37611-12 (1970) (remarks of Senator Holland); Legislative History at
475.
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Secretary of Labor, with the substitute bill providing for the inde-
pendent Commission, manifests this intent: "[T]he substitute pro-
posal would create an independent Presidentially appointed Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Appeals Commission whose only function
would be to conduct hearings on alleged violations discovered by the
Secretary . . . 1'61 The conclusion that the Commission was in-
tended to serve solely as a court is further buttressed by the removal
in conference of the only provision that would have given the
Commission an extrajudicial function, the collection of penalties.
This function was assigned to the Secretary. 62
THE PARTY ISSUE IN OTHER AGENCIES
The FTC, ICC, SEC, FPC, and a number of other federal
regulatory agencies are parties in judicial proceedings which review
their orders. Many of these agencies do not have specific statutory
authority to appear in court to defend their rulings, but the propri-
ety of this practice has not been questioned. 63 These agencies have a
sufficient interest in the proceedings because they administer the
statutory enforcement scheme, and consequently a judicial decree
must be directed to them in order to afford full relief." In this
'I 116 Cong. Rec. 35607 (1970) (statement of Senator Saxbe) (emphasis added); Legisla-
tive History at 298.
62
 29 U.S.C. § 66600(1970). See also Legislative History at 1194-95.
h3
 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). See also 3 K. Davis, Administra-
tive Law Treatise § 22.15, at 283 n.23 (1958).
U The Federal Trade Commission is fairly representative of existing regulatory agencies.
Coincidentally, an off-hand comparison between the Commission and the FTC during Senate
debate has been frequently cited to support the assertion of party status by the Commission.
The comment which was made by Senator Javits follows:
I introduced the administration's bill originally, and the provision I now offer as an
amendment is consistent with the approval of that bill. It creates a rtview commis-
sion which will deal with all complaints referred to it by the Secretary and which
will have the same type of authority that the Federal Trade Commission exercises;
the power to issue a cease and desist order which, if challenged within a given period
of time, can be reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Its operation is stayed if
the Circuit Cuurt of Appeals so orders. If the Secretary desires to enforce the order
through the contempt power, similarly, he can go into court in order Rol get the
Circuit Court of Appeals to enter an order for the specific purpose, and then that
order can be enforced through the contempt powers of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is the traditional Federal Trade Commission type of procedure.
116 Cong. Rec. 37607 (1970) (remarks of Senator Javits); Legislative History at 462.
Even from the standpoint of those who support party status for the Commission, this
reference is, at best, a short-hand manner of conveying the thought that the Commission was
to adjudicate cases as was done by the FTC and, at worst, an explanation of the enforcement
procedure which would result from the adoption of the amendment—a procedure covering the
functions of both the Secretary and the Commission which Javits equated with the FTC's
cease and desist procedure. Both the language of the Javits amendment and the Senator's
explanation of it indicate that, it is incorrect to attempt to ascribe to Senator Javits an intent
that the Commission operate like the FTC in ways other than the conduct of hearings.
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respect, the role of these agencies under the laws they administer is
identical to that of the Secretary of Labor, and not the Commission,
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Moreover, by vest-
ing the administration and enforcement of a single statute in one
agency of the executive branch and adjudication in another, Con-
gress departed from precedent, because, unlike OSAHRC, the es-
tablished regulatory agencies perform all of these functions. 65
There are agencies with solely adjudicatory functions outside
the court system which are parties to appeals from their rulings.
Such participation, however, is restricted to those agencies which
are (a) so authorized by statute, (b) are charged with administering
enforcement of their orders, or (c) must participate in order to
provide representation for the public interest. The NLRB, for ex-
ample, is by statute charged with the enforcement of its orders66 and
is, in fact, made the representative of the public interest since it is
given the responsibility of preventing "any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice . . affecting commerce." 67 The practices
of these agencies, however, is not diapositive of the issue of the
Commission's party status since OSAHRC has not been made a
party by statute and is not charged with obtaining enforcement of its
orders. The public interest in achieving occupational safety and
health for America's working people is a responsibility which has
been given to the Secretary of Labor who represents that interest as
a party both before the Commission and the courts. 68
OSAHRC, then, is a unique agency within the executive
branch of the federal government. The closest comparative agency
appears to be the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB). 69
The statute providing for judicial review of that agency's awards
does not include a reference to respondents in petitions for review
Moreover, the Commission is unlike the FTC in that it has no authority to regulate business,
no enforcement power and cannot prosecute.
It should be noted that the Commission has no cease and desist power, but the Act's
statutory enforcement scheme under which citations become binding 15 working days after
being served if not contested within that time is quite similar to a cease and desist order. It is
apparent that Senator Javits had in mind the entire statutory scheme which his amendment
would introduce when he made this statement.
65
 The established regulatory agencies separate these duties within the agencies them-
selves. Whether this is mandated by statute (e.g., National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (1970)) or the result of internal agency policy (e.g., Federal Trade Commission), the
separation of these functions is necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-58 (1970).
66
 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). The NLRB General Counsel, who by statute is independent
of the membership of the Board, is charged with investigating and prosecuting actions before
the Board members and with administering enforcement. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
67
 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
68 29 U.S.C. §§ 657, 660(b) (1970).
69
 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
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nor does it explicitly exclude the Board as a party." It was held in a
case in which the Board members had been joined as respondents,
however, that the Board was not a proper party to the action. 7 ' The
judicial character of the Board, and the absence of any non-
adjudicatory functions, persuaded the court that it would be as
inappropriate to name the Board as a respondent as it would to
name a trial judge in an appeal. The court said:
The NRAB functions solely as an allegedly impartial
adjudicatory tribunal, unlike a body such as the Federal
Trade Commission, which operates as a quasi-legislative
body. Petitions seeking review of FTC decisions normally
name the agency as respondent. This is because the agency
maintains an interest in its decisions, which represents part
of its function to administer certain laws and formulate
policy, and which accordingly makes the Commission a
proper respondent to a petition for review. The NRAB has
neither legislative nor prosecutorial functions—it sits
merely as an adjudicative body, and does not administer
laws or formulate policy. 72
A persuasive analogy can also be drawn to the Tax Court."
The Tax Court, which was transferred to the judiciary less than five
years ago, 74
 was originally an independent agency within the execu-
tive branch. Prior to the transfer, the 3rd Circuit stated:
The Tax Court is . . . for all practical purposes a judicial
tribunal operating in the federal judicial system. Whether
it is a legislative court created by Congress under Article I,
section 8, of the Constitution, like the Customs Court, or
some other form of judicial agency placed for convenience
of housekeeping in the Executive Branch of the Govern-
nient is, therefore, merely a matter of legal semantics
since, whatever it may be called, it is an "independent"
judicial agency the work of which is not subject to supervi-
sion or review in the Executive Branch of the Government
but only by the federal appellate courts. 75
The court ruled in this case that the judicial character of the
Tax Court required that it follow the traditional judicial practice of
'° 45 U,S.C.	 153(q) (1970).
71
 System Federation v. Braidwood, 284 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. III. 1968).
" 2 Id. at 610-11.
73
 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1970).
'4
 See S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2027, 2340-44.
75 Stern v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 701, 707-708 (3d Cir. 1954).
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including in the record the names of the judges who rendered the
decision:76
The essential nature of the Tax Court was the basis for other
decisions which established that it possessed judicial powers and
that it had the duty to apply doctrines governing judicial decision-
making rather than those applicable to administrative agencies.
Thus, in the case of Reo Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue," the Sixth Circuit found that the Tax Court had jurisdic-
tion to vacate and correct a decision after it became final, similar to
the jurisdiction of courts to grant writs of error coram nobis. 78 In
another case decided in 1955, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and estoppel by judgment could be
invoked by a party before the Tax Court, even though these doc-
trines did not apply to administrative actions." Again, the judicial
function performed by the Tax Court was determinative:
[Wihether the Tax Court be regarded as a court or as an
administrative agency, it is exercising judicial functions in
hearing tax cases of this character; and, when exercising
judicial functions, as distinguished from administrative
functions, it is bound to apply such fundamental judicial
doctrines as res judicata and estoppel, 8 °
Notwithstanding the basic differences which exist among the
Review Commission, the Tax Court and the National Railway
Adjustment Board," the analogy between the Commission and
these other bodies is significant for the purpose of determining the
party status question. The decisions holding that the Tax Court and
the NRAB should exercise the powers and observe the practices of
courts rested solely on the fact that their functions and respon-
sibilities were similar to those delegated to the judiciary. The nature
of the cases or the parties before them was not considered.
EFFECTS OF THE ISSUE'S RESOLUTION
A resolution of the Commission party status issue by recogni-
tion that OSAHRC is, like the NRAB and the pre-1969 Tax Court,
76
 Id. at 706-08.
77
 219 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1955).
76
 Id. at 612.
Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 627 {4th Cir. 1955).
'° Id.
s' The Tax Court determines dollar liabilities between taxpayers and the government,
and the tax laws, unlike occupational safety and health laws, do not have a remedial purpose.
The National Railway Adjustment Board functions as an arbitration tribunal in a scheme of
compulsory arbitration. Its awards are to private parties.
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a de facto court would have wide-ranging implications for the
manner in which the Commission conducts its internal business and
resolves other issues. For example, in January 1973 the Commission
ruled in Wetmore & Parman, Inc., 82 that where the Secretary of
Labor, as prosecutor, had charged a violation of the Act to be
non-wilful, the Commission could not hold the violation to be wilful
even if the evidence would support such a fincling. 83 This conclusion
is consistent with the practice of constitutional courts of refraining
from interfering with prosecutorial discretion." The decisions of the
Commission on other issues, however, have been inconsistent with
judicial practice, and would have to fall in line should the judicial
character of the Commission be established. The Commission's in-
sistence that it has authority to supervise settlement agreements
after it has issued an order, as in the Madden case, is one example.
Lastly, one possibly adverse effect which might result from
denial of party status to the Commission should be mentioned. If
early experience is a barometer for the future, many petitions for
review filed by the Department of Labor will not be defended by
employers. 85
 The explanation for this phenomenon is that, in most
cases, the penalty which could be assessed is only a fraction of the
cost of counsel fees for appellate litigation. 86
 Consequently, unless
the corrective measures which might be ordered in a particular case
are very costly, it often will be more practical for him to forego the
cost of appellate litigation 87
 and await the outcome of the Labor
Department's effort to overturn the OSAHRC decision in his
favor. 88
 Thus, the employer would probably choose not to defend in
the court of appeals unless he is imbued with an unusually freeborn
spirit and the dogged belief that he is right. Without the benefit of
having both sides of the issue fully briefed, the task of the court of
12
 [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Dees. 11 15,400, at 20,610 (Review Comm'n
1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 221).
15 Id.
84
 That the prosecutor has authority to decide the nature of the charges is a well-
established rule, at least in the area of criminal law. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 171-172 (5th Cir. 1965).
15
 Two-thirds of the first 50 appeals from OSAHRC decisions were filed by the Secre-
tary of Labor.
"" 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). While citations for wilful or repeated violations can carry a
penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation, and those for failure to abate during the
prescribed period, a penalty of $1,000 per day, actions under these provisions of the law are
rare.
" 1
 There is no requirement that an employer retain an attorney to contest an OSHA
enforcement action. Many in fact proceed pro se before the Commission. An internal tabula-
tion made by OSAHRC during December 1973 showed that employers appeared pro se in
45% of the cases.
68
 This has already occurred in a number of cases. See, e.g., Brennan v. OSAHRC &
Brent Towing Co., 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973).
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appeals in deciding a case will likely be more difficult. 89 The court's
convenience or the additional illumination of issues which briefs
might supply are, however, hardly a justifiable basis for granting
party status to the Commission where such status is inconsistent
with the congressional intent or legislative scheme. 9°
CONCLUSION
The congressional purpose in creating the Commission and the
judicial functions to which it has been confined are inconsistent with
OSAHRC's participation as a party in appellate reviews of its deci-
sions. In recognition of its essential judicial character, perhaps the
Commission should be moved to the judicial branch, following the
precedent of the Tax Court. Such a move would clarify the present
ambiguous status of OSAHRC and would eliminate the thorny
problems that are likely to constantly arise because of that ambigu-
ity."
°9 This may be one reason the Commission has received letters in a few instances from
the clerk of the 5th Circuit which could be interpreted as virtual orders to file a brief. The
court itself commented upon the Commission's failure to file a brief in Brennan v. OSAHRC
& Bill Echols Trucking Co., 487 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1973): "Whether out of utter frustration,
battle fatigue, or neglect, neither the Commissioner nor Echols saw fit to file a responsive
brief, although both had been solicited and importuned to do so." Id. at 232 (emphasis
added). This kind of approach by the court appears inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. 516 (1970).
It also overlooks the fact that Congress has appropriated no funds to the Review Commission
for employing counsel, the preparation and printing of briefs, or the payment of court costs.
Funds for such purposes are appropriated to the Department of Justice but the Attorney
General has declined to undertake the representation of OSAHRC in the court of appeal.
9° There is also some question whether the court could properly consider a brief from
OSAHRC which offers a rationale for the Commission's disposition of a case which was not
set out in its opinion.
91 On July 29, 1974, as this article was going to press, the Ninth Circuit held, in Madden
v. Hodgson that the Review Commission was not entitled to representation in civil litigation.
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